This paper is the first to study the effect of European antidumping policy on market structure. We analyze the incentives for firms to engage in a domestic or international cartel of implicit collusion in a multi-stage setting and concentrate on how European antidumping policy influences the incentives for firms to collude domestically or internationally. The question is tackled of whether antidumping regulation helps to establish, maintain or rather endanger full cartels as well as cartels restricted to domestic firms only. Our findings suggest that antidumping legislation can both have a procompetitive and an anti-competitive effect. Which case prevails depends crucially on the welfare objective function used by the European government and also on the cost asymmetry and the degree of product heterogeneity between domestic and foreign firms. In addition to market structure we also discuss welfare effects. We find that antidumping measures are capable of both increasing or decreasing total community welfare depending on the type of measures installed.
Introduction
The policy importance of antidumping regulation is easily illustrated by looking at the WTO agenda where it is together with trade and competition policy one of the top ranking items (European Economic Perspectives, n° 11, 1996) . Given the complexity of the issue, theoretical analysis could prove useful for policy makers and others involved in future discussions on antidumping policy. In this paper we analyze when and how European antidumping regulation provides incentives for domestic and foreign firms to engage or not in implicit collusion. Our theoretical model follows European legislation and its implementation as closely as possible. It will become clear that antidumping measures, which in principle are trade policy measures, not only affect the degree of competition in the market but can also alter market structure. We both find cases of European antidumping policy colluding and colliding with antitrust policy.
In the academic literature, the analysis of antidumping policy under imperfect competition has recently progressed. One strand of emerging literature deals with the impact of anti-dumping policy on production decisions of domestic and foreign firms (see Dixit (1988) , Anderson (1992) , Prusa (1992) , (1994) , Fischer (1992) , Reitzes (1993) ). The consensus there is that the mere threat of antidumping law enforcement affects firms' decision-making.
Another strand of literature deals more specifically with the relationship between cartels and anti-dumping policy. Staiger & Wolak (1989) show that the imposition of anti-dumping duties may reduce the attractiveness of collusion for foreign firms in their own markets, restricting the possibility to dump excess capacity in the protected market, thereby suggesting a pro-competitive effect of domestic antidumping policy in the foreign market. At the same time, in a repeated game setting anti-dumping duties can be used by domestic firms to credibly punish deviations by foreign firms from * Financial support from the NFWO grant G.0296.96 and the EC-HCMP grant CHRXCT93-0297 is gratefully acknowledged. Comments from participants of the CES/KUL International Economics Workshop, as well as seminars at Center/Tilburg, UCL Louvain-la-neuve, UPF Barcelona, LSE London School of Economics, the 1995 CEPR-ERWIT meeting in Thessaloniki and the 23 rd Annual EARIE conference in Vienna were greatly appreciated.
an international cartel scenario. This was demonstrated by Staiger & Wolak (1992) suggesting an anti-competitive effect of antidumping policy.
Although the model presented in this paper could be used to analyze the central issues of the first strand of literature, we will predominantly focus our attention on how antidumping policy influences the incentives for, and the profitability of, domestic and international implicit cartels in the European market. Hence, the main question tackled in this paper is whether a European-like antidumping regulation helps to establish, maintain or rather endanger full cartels as well as cartels restricted to domestic firms only. For this purpose we construct a partial equilibrium model, restricting antidumping law enforcement to the European government. The set up is a multi-stage one with perfect foresight for all players and no a priori commitment by the government whether and which measure to impose, where the market structure is endogenous both before and after the antidumping petition.
In contrast to most papers in this area we will consider European rather than American antidumping rules where besides duties, undertakings are an important type of antidumping measures and where the focus of the antidumping law seems to be more on the injury than on the dumping requirement (Tharakan and Waelbroeck 1994) .
European antidumping policy is characterized by both a country and a sector bias. In the 1980's most dumping complaints were issued against Japan and Central Europe, while in the 1990's mainly Chinese and Russian imports in the European market (EU) were accused of dumping. A great number of cases involve the chemical sector and to a lesser extent also the mechanical engineering, consumer electronics, the wood and the steel industry. In general, the products originating from Central Europe and Russia tend to be fairly standard and similar to the European import competing products such as copper sulfate, potassium permanganate, and ball bearings. In contrast, the products imported in the EU from Japan and China tend to be more differentiated from their European counterparts (photocopiers, video recorders, CD-players, semiconductors).
In most antidumping cases the defending country has a cost advantage over the European producers. Therefore, we will assume that dumping is efficiency-driven rather than predatory-driven.
Although we do not exclude the possibility that in some antidumping cases predatory motives of foreign firms may be at play, a cheer cost advantage of the foreign firm or even a small degree of product differentiation suffice for the dumping and injury conditions outlined in the European antidumping law to be met.
The results of the model are derived algebraically and simulations are used to gain greater insight. Our findings suggest that the type of measures taken, their impact on the incentives to collude and the resulting market structure, as well as their welfare effects all depend on the specification of the objective function of the government together with the extent of cost-asymmetry and product differentiation. When the welfare objective is total national welfare, antidumping regulation is anti-competitive and cartelizes the market. In that case we observe mainly duties and the domestic welfare effect is positive. When the government excludes domestic consumer interests from its welfare objective, we predict a lot more undertakings which can have both an anti-or a procompetitive effect but in any case decrease total domestic welfare.
In the next section we discuss the model in detail. Section 3 reports the results of measures imposed and changes in market structure for various degrees of cost-asymmetry. The robustness of these results are checked in section 4 where we consider extensions of the model. The welfare effects are discussed in section 5, where the possibilities for rent-shifting are examined. In line of the political economy of protection hypotheses, the issue of rent-seeking is touched upon in section 6.
The last section summarizes the main results and hints at some policy conclusions.
The model
In order to study the effect of anti-dumping legislation on market structure and more specifically on the profitability of national and international collusion, a simple model is used with 3 firms: 1 foreign and two domestic firms. The analysis focuses only on the local market in which the anti-dumping legislation prevails. The two domestic firms are perfectly symmetric, producing a homogeneous good. The foreign firm supplies a differentiated good that typically can be supplied at lower (or equal) costs as compared to the domestic products. The local market is fully segmented from other international markets, including the home market of the foreign firm such that the foreign firm's objective can be restricted to its profits in the local market. All this results in the following demand function for the domestic product,
where the subscript i ≠ j=1,2 represents either of the domestic firms in the model while subscript F refers to the foreign firm. While the parameter a is a measure of market size, the parameter γ γ measures product differentiation between the domestic and the foreign product (0< γ ≤1). Demand for the domestic and foreign product are independent when γ=0. Products become closer substitutes as γ moves closer to 1.
Conversely for the foreign product, we have
In order to facilitate notation, in what follows we will consider p i ' and p F ' rather than p i and p F which are defined as the domestic and foreign prices minus the constant marginal cost of each firm respectively,
where m( F ) represents the constant marginal cost of the domestic firms (m) and foreign (m F ) firm.
The cost asymmetry between the domestic firms and the foreign firm is reflected in
The parameter s lies between zero and 1 (0 < s ≤1) and measures the degree of cost-asymmetry between the domestic firms and the foreign firm. The smaller s, the larger is the disadvantage of the local firm. In order to have a viable domestic industry, γ is required to be smaller than s.
With three firms in the industry, the following three market structure outcomes can arise (see figure 1) i) a triopoly with all firms deciding non-cooperatively on their output decision à la Cournot-Nash, further labeled as the (1+1+1)-scenario. The maximand in this case is: In the event of a domestic cartel (ii) or a full cartel (iii), both internal and external stability as described by d 'Aspremont et al. (1983) are required. The notion of internal stability requires that every firm in the cartel has an incentive to join. Whereas external stability means that every firm behaving non-cooperatively against the cartel does not want to join or will be excluded by the cartel members if an extension of the cartel hurts the members. According to this 'coalition proofness' concept, also used in Malueg and Tsutsui (1995) , the domestic cartel (2+1)-scenario will be the outcome if the domestic firms increase their profits with respect to a triopoly and when either the domestic firms or the foreign firm do not want to join a full cartel. A full cartel (3) -scenario will only prevail if both domestic firms as well as the foreign firm realize higher profits as compared to the alternative (2+1) or the (1+1+1) -scenario.
1 Note that a coalition of one domestic firm and one foreign firm is never an equilibrium choice given that it is always dominated by either a cartel with only domestic firms or a full cartel of all firms.
As soon as all coordinating firms, (both domestic firms in the (2+1) -scenario and all 3 firms in the (3)-scenario), realize higher profits from cooperation as compared to the non-cooperative outcome, it is assumed that cooperation between these firms can be established. 2 This assumption 1 The option of side payments made by one party to induce the other party to the payer's most preferred outcome would typically lead to the outcome where the highest joint profits are realized. Given problems of legal enforceability, the option of side payments is only marginally considered in further analysis (see section 4). 2 Despite the benefits from cooperation, this cooperative outcome is not a Nash equilibrium in a oneshot quantity/price game, given the incentives to cheat, cf. the Prisoner's Dilemma. However, it is well known that such a cooperation can be established in an (in)finitely repeated version of the quantity game, if players are sufficiently patient, while using grim trigger strategies, (Green & This condition is always met in the model with the foreign firm not necessarily producing in the local market and the perfectly symmetric domestic firms, having an identical incentive to file.
iii) The foreign firm's price in the local market is lower than the domestic price. This price undercutting determines the "injury margin 6 Note that this undercutting is more likely to hold with a cost-disadvantage of the domestic firms.
The EU anti-dumping legislation does not in any instance discriminate between "injury" following from normal competition and "injury" from predatory behavior on the part of the foreign company to drive out domestic firms. Given no incentives for predation in our full-information one shotproduction game, the "injury" is only caused by normal competition.
(1984)) or stick & carrot strategies (Abreu et al (1986) ). Also Staiger & Wolak (1992) use an infinitely repeated scenario to establish stability of profitable collusion.
In case the domestic firm(s) decide to file, there are legal expenses for all firms, including for the foreign firm, presented by ε >0. The domestic firm will decide to file if the net benefits after filing outweigh the legal costs ε. (Vandenbussche (1996) ) that the level of a duty imposed equals the priceundercutting in the period prior to the filing of a case. Hence we will set the duty, t, equal to the prefile difference between p i and p F . To the extent that the foreign firm will absorb part of the tariff, a duty will typically not lead to equal post-file prices.
In deciding if and which measure to impose, the government is assumed to choose the action that will maximize local welfare represented by G. European antidumping legislation requires policy makers to consider the 'Community's Interest' as a whole when taking protectionist action. This
Community Interest Clause corresponds quite well with economists' notion of national welfare, which is composed of three elements, local consumer surplus (CS) domestic firms' profits (PS= 2(π i -ε)) and any possible tariff revenue (T= t.q F ).
G = CS + PS + T (6)
Consumer surplus is given by the following expression
European policy makers have often been accused of ignoring consumers' interests despite the Community Interest Clause. One plausible explanation for this is that producers are in general more willing to fund and organize lobbying activities than consumers. Another often heard critique is that trade policy, such as anti-dumping measures, are used for industrial policy purposes (Gual (1995) ), again rendering local producers' profits more important in the government's objective function. Also, regarding the tariff revenue, there are several possibilities. In principle, the EU government has to refund the duty revenue collected during the period of protection, to the foreign firm. However, when asked for a refund, it can last up to 10 years before the European government actually reimburses the money. For the reasons just explained we will consider three different government welfare functions.
First, including all the welfare components, second dropping consumers interests and third a welfare function consisting of European producers' surplus only.
Figure 1 outlines the model structure.. The equilibrium outcome in terms of whether and which anti-dumping measure will be imposed and which market structure will prevail is determined through a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium which is obtained through backward induction. To characterize the Nash-equilibrium outcome, first the government's choice between no measure, a duty or an undertaking has to be determined, on the basis of which the post-file quantity choices will be made.
-Insert figure 1 about here- Table 1 summarizes for every final node of the game tree the corresponding values of domestic (q i ) and foreign output (q F ), domestic (π i ) and foreign (πF ) profit and the level of the duty t where applicable 9 . From the calculations it is clear that within a particular market structure, the domestic firms will always prefer an undertaking decision over a duty, although the difference between the two outcomes becomes smaller with smaller asymmetries. Consumer surplus will typically be lower with an undertaking decision as compared to a duty, except in a full cartel market structure, in which case consumer surplus turns out to be higher with undertakings than with duties.
Again, this difference decreases when asymmetries are reduced. The foreign firm likewise prefers an undertaking over a duty in most instances. 10 Whereas local producers always benefit from the intervention, local consumers are always on the losers' side. The foreign firm also looses, typically when its cost advantage is large and when duties are imposed. 11 As already indicated, all these results hold for a given market structure. What remains to be established is the main contribution of the paper, namely profits and welfare when market structure can be chosen endogenously in the full model structure.
Given the government's decision, the domestic firms' decision whether or not to file in case the conditions for filing are met, are determined on the basis of profit maximization. Given the filing decision, the choice of market structure can finally be assessed, following the procedure described supra. The equilibrium outcome, in terms of market structure chosen and the type of anti-dumping measure imposed, is discussed in section 3. The results are discussed as a function of the level of costasymmetry (parameter s) and product differentiation (parameter γ) and this for the various policy implementation scenarios discussed supra. Some robustness checks are discussed in section 4, while the welfare implications are suspended until section 5.
10 Except in a domestic cartel, where a duty results in higher foreign profits than an undertaking decision, at least if the asymmetry is not too small, i.e. s<s* where s* decreases for lower values for γ. 11 Foreign firms may however gain from undertakings, but only when the cost asymmetry is small (in the infra reported numerical example when s=0.95 for a domestic cartel and s=0.8 for a triopoly). 
The Results
The basic focus of this paper is on the impact of the presence of an EU-like anti-dumping legislation on the incentives for firms to engage or not in domestic or full cartels. For this purpose, the outcome with the anti-dumping legislation, as follows from table 1, is compared to the outcome in case of no anti-dumping legislation, which amounts to comparing firm profits and national welfare in the various no-file outcomes, as reported in the same table 1. While the foreign firm always prefers a full cartel in the no-file situation, the domestic firms can prefer a full cartel versus a domestic cartel or a non-cooperative outcome depending on the asymmetries and product heterogeneity, indicating that each of these three market outcomes can prevail in the no-file situation.
The results are based on numerical simulations with modest filing costs, i.e. ε=0.1 which amounts to about 1% of the pre-entry domestic profits. Sensitivity of the results with respect to filing costs will be taken up in section 4. The discussion of the results is illustrated with graphs in the (s, γ)-
space. The parameter s, plotted on the Y-axis, represents different values of cost asymmetry where s=1
is the symmetric case. The parameter γ, plotted on the X-axis represents different values of product heterogeneity where γ =1 is the identical product case. In order to maintain a viable domestic industry, the restriction is imposed that products need to be increasingly more differentiated when cost-asymmetries become larger: γ <s. The EU antidumping legislation requires that the foreign product is a 'like product' or a similar product compared to the locally produced product. Therefore we limit our attention to parameter constellations s > γ > 0.55. Figures 2 through 4 show equilibrium market structure outcomes without and with European anti-dumping policy. show that antidumping policy in many cases changes the market structure. In what follows the results will be discussed for each possible initial market structure.
(i) A full cartel as pre-or no anti-dumping outcome
The easiest scenario to start with is the full cartel scenario (area D) in figure 2. In the absence of anti-dumping procedures, if cost-asymmetries are small and furthermore products are sufficiently differentiated, not only the foreign firm, but also the domestic firms have an interest in joining a full cartel. When an EU-like anti-dumping procedures prevail, domestic firms will file 13 .
The government prefers an undertaking over a duty in case of full cartelization, despite the forbearance of duty revenues but because domestic profits together with consumer surplus are higher.
All this implies no change in market outcome in the existence of an EU-like anti-dumping legislation;
12 What is not represented in the graphs are the anti-dumping measures that prevail in other, out-ofequilibrium market structures. These choices will show up in the description of the results to explain the arising of the various equilibria. 13 A full implicit cartel with asymmetric firms does not imply equal prices of the firms. Hence priceundercutting is possible. a full cartel is maintained, while domestic firm's profits and welfare improve through the undertaking.
-insert figure 2 about here- sufficiently, but not excessively differentiated (area B). In these areas the foreign firm always prefers a full cartel. Such a full cartel is not desired by the domestic firms given that they are at too much a cost-disadvantage relative to the foreign firm (area A) or because products are not enough differentiated (area B). Consequently, the domestic firms would be carrying the largest share of the cost of colluding which comes from restricting output in order to increase price. In the absence of side payments from the foreign to the domestic firms, a cartel restricted to the domestic firms only will be the market structure outcome.
If antidumping legislation prevails, it matters crucially which measure the government will take.
14 In case of large asymmetries (area A), the government will always impose a duty if domestic firms file, whatever the market structure that would arise. This typically implies that a domestic cartel is maintained as market structure and the presence of anti-dumping legislation has no impact on market structure. The duty nevertheless increases domestic profits and total welfare despite a drop in consumer surplus. If the foreign product is sufficiently differentiated (γ ≤ s -0.2), it would pay for the domestic firms to move to a full cartel, because the tariff has smoothened enough the prevailing disadvantages. However, in this case, the foreign firm, given the imposition of a duty, prefers to behave non-cooperatively against the domestic cartel rather than joining a full cartel, leaving again the no-file market structure unaffected by the dumping regulation.
When the asymmetries are small, the government would still impose a duty in case the market structure is a domestic cartel 15 . As long as also a duty is imposed in a full cartel, we have an identical market structure with or without anti-dumping regulation (area A) in figure 2. But if the government prefers an undertaking in a full cartel, which occurs if products are not too differentiated and asymmetry is low enough, then the domestic firms prefer a full cartel over a domestic cartel only.
A switch in market structure will however only occur if the foreign firm is willing to cooperate with the domestic cartel, given the presence of an undertaking decision. This will only occur if the cost advantage of the foreign firm is not too large (area B). Hence, in this area of parameter configurations, the presence of an EU-like anti-dumping regulation increases the scope for collusion:
from a domestic cartel only to a full international cartel: a case where anti-dumping regulation clashes with anti-trust.
(iii) A triopoly as pre-or no-anti-dumping outcome
The case of a triopoly as the pre-anti-dumping -scenario, arises if products are not too differentiated (γ<s, is never lower than 0.8). That is to say that foreign entry will cause the pre-entry domestic cartel to break down (areas C and E in figure 2).
Note that when asymmetries are too small (s > 0.8), there will be no injury or price undercutting if the market structure would be a non-cooperative triopoly. Hence, in this case the domestic firms have no filing option in a triopoly, but they can file in case of cartelization. With consumer interests taken into account, the government imposes a duty in case of a domestic cartel (area E) but prefers an undertaking in case of a full cartel (area C). With firms correctly anticipating these government choices, they will prefer a full cartel setting, given the higher protection offered through the undertaking (area C). Hence anti-dumping legislation turns a triopoly into a full cartel with undertaking. We have here again a clear instance where anti-dumping clashes with anti-trust. If the asymmetry is large (0.8 < s < 0.9), "only" a domestic cartel will be established (area E), despite the preference of the domestic firms for a full cartel, but because the foreign firm prefers to behave non-cooperatively. In any case, the foreign firm will gain from the existence of anti-dumping regulation, and this because of the induced change from a triopoly to a cartel.
Prediction 1 : When the Community Interest Clause is implemented, the EU anti-dumping regulation is anti-competitive when products are not very differentiated and/or cost asymmetries are relatively modest. In these cases, the market structure moves from a triopoly to a full cartel (area C) or from a domestic cartel towards a full cartel (area B).

Cost asymmetries: the community interest clause unimplemented (G=PS +T) (i) A full cartel as pre-or no anti-dumping outcome
When ignoring consumer interests, government would decide on duties in the full cartel but will prefer an undertaking in a domestic cartel. Given that the domestic firms can perfectly foresee these government choices, they will prefer to collude only internally, in which case an undertaking will arise, rather than to join a full cartel with duties. Hence, we have a situation where the antidumping legislation reduces the scope for collusion, from a full international cartel to a domestic cartel only 16 .
-insert figure 3 about hereFigure 3: Change in Market Structure and Antidumping Measures
Consumer surplus excluded from Government'objective G = PS +T (ii) A domestic cartel as pre-or no-anti-dumping outcome
When a domestic cartel prevails without anti-dumping, which is the case when asymmetries are large or products are sufficiently differentiated (areas H, G and F) in figure 3, different outcomes prevail depending on government's decisions.
If the cost-asymmetry is large (s < 0.7), a duty is imposed independent of the market structure and the domestic cartel is maintained (area H). Hence, anti-dumping causes no effect on market structure but welfare improves from the duty. However if the asymmetry is not too large (0.7 < s, γ < 0.8), the government will impose an undertaking in a domestic cartel (2+1)-scenario. In a triopolistic market structure the government would be even more inclined towards undertakings (already with 0.7 ≤ s < 0.8). Given these government decisions, firms will always file if conditions are met, but will the market structure be affected by the existence of an EU-like anti-dumping legislation ? When the government decides on an undertaking in the (2+1)-scenario 17 , the domestic cartel is maintained and anti-dumping again does not affect the market structure (area F).
However, there exist parameter configurations in which imposition of an EU-like antidumping legislation could destroy a domestic cartel, turning a (2+1) -scenario into a triopoly outcome, namely those configurations where the government would only decide on an undertaking in case of triopoly while favoring a duty in case of cartelization, which arises with larger asymmetries and large enough product differentiation (area G). In such a situation the domestic firm will abstain from colluding, with "only" duties applying. Instead, they will prefer a non-cooperative setting, in which case a more favorable undertaking, decided by the government, will more than compensate for the foregone collusive profits. This is at least if filing is possible in a triopoly (s < 0.85). Hence the presence of an anti-dumping regulation would break a domestic cartel and establish a triopoly, be it with an undertaking. We here have again a case where anti-dumping legislation induces procompetitive outcomes !
(iii) A triopoly as pre-or no-anti-dumping outcome
A triopoly as pre-anti-dumping scenario arises if products are not too differentiated (area J in figure 3 ). In the presence of an anti-dumping regulation, where there is no filing possibility in triopoly, the domestic firms will be willing to collude domestically, only because of the protection offered by the antidumping regulation. Indeed, when consumer interests are ignored, the government would always decide on an undertaking in case of filing, independent of the market structure 16 If the government would commit to a duty , the full cartel can be maintained. A commitment to an undertaking decision, would install a (2,1) scenario. Because of the tariff revenues the government would prefer to commit to a duty rather than an undertaking, when it ignores consumer interests.
prevailing. In the presence of such undertaking, the domestic firms will be colluding. The scope of this collusion is restricted to the domestic firms only. A full cartel is not attractive for the domestic firms, with an advantaged foreign player, given the too homogeneous products. Hence, the EU-like anti-dumping legislation would result in a domestic cartel that would else have broken down because of the foreign entry, again a case where anti-dumping is anti-competitive. figure 3 ) when products are not too similar. Only for very similar products, an anti-competitive effect on market structure arises (area J in figure 3 ).
Prediction 2: When consumers' interests are ignored, the EU anti-dumping regulation either does not change market structure (areas H, F in figure 3) or is pro-competitive (areas G, K in
Cost asymmetries: Domestic Producers Interest only (G =PS)
Given that tariff revenues may not always be permanently acquired, it is worthwhile to consider the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion or not of tariff revenues in the government's objective function.
When tariff revenues are ignored and only domestic firm profits are taken into account, domestic firms will always file if conditions are met, given that the government will always impose an undertaking throughout. All this implies that the pro-competitive effect of anti-dumping regulation derived supra (area G in figure 3 ), vanishes when tariff revenues are ignored. Indeed the procompetitive effect arose because the government decided on an undertaking in triopoly but, induced by the revenue generation, would impose a duty in a duopoly, pushing the domestic firm away from a domestic collusion towards non-cooperative behavior. In this area of parameter configurations, in the absence of tariff revenues, the domestic cartel that would prevail without anti-dumping regulation is maintained in case of anti-dumping regulation, be it with undertaking. The pro-competitive effect of anti-dumping regulation in case of high differentiation and low asymmetry, where a full cartel with duties would be abandoned for a domestic cartel with undertaking (area K in figure 3 ), is maintained even if undertakings would also prevail in a full cartel. This indicates that this pro-competitive effect
Hence, from an anti-trust point of view, government's commitment to anti-dumping intervention is undesirable, at least in this parameter constellation.
prevails as soon as their is protection, not necessarily because of higher protection in less cooperative settings.
Note that the results described here; anti-competitive effects of antidumping in case of low differentiation and pro-competitive effects in case of low asymmetry and high differentiation, depend on the peculiarity that the government will always impose an undertaking, in the absence of tariff revenues. Consequently, the results reported can also be interpreted as the outcome in case of government's commitment to an undertaking decision.
Prediction 3: When the government's welfare function coincides with domestic producers' interests, the EU antidumping regulation has a pro-competitive effect in case of high differentiation and low cost asymmetry and an anti-competitive effect in case of low differentiation.
Robustness of the Results
Side payments and cooperative solutions
If side payments between producers are allowed and are legally enforceable, the market outcome that would prevail with and without anti-dumping, is the outcome that yields the highest total industry profits, which is a full cartel setting. Irrespective of asymmetries and product differentiation, the foreign firm always realizes enough extra benefits from a full cartel to compensate the domestic firms. Hence, whatever the outcome of the anti-dumping procedure, the final market outcome will always be a full cartel, without the domestic firms filing. While anti-dumping does not affect the market outcome in this case, it will affect the size of the money transfer required from the foreign firm to compensate the domestic firms to move to a full cartel. With a number of noticeable exemptions (cf. supra), the foreign firm typically looses and hence is willing to pay more to move to its preferred outcome.
Similarly, if firms are allowed to explicitly cooperate (which is forbidden by law), anything that Pareto dominates the alternative scenario can be established 19 . With joint (domestic and foreign)
profits always highest in a full cartel, the latter will be the final market outcome in all cases. While the presence of antidumping does not affect the market outcome in this case, it does affect what parties can secure in the bargaining process, by affecting the threat point positions.
4.2. Pre-file settlements.
In most of the observed outcomes, domestic firms will file and governments will impose an anti-dumping measure, be it a duty or an undertaking. With the model assumption of complete information, the foreign firm can and will correctly anticipate the government's decision. Why then would the foreign firm not immediately select the price/quantity combination that would prevail after the government intervention, hence avoiding filing costs ? Note that in such a case, we would never observe any anti-dumping intervention, which contradicts empirical observations.
Typically, this problem is tackled in the literature by assuming uncertainty about the government decision (e.g. Reitzes (1993) ), for instance because of uncertainty about the importance of the various components in the welfare function. A comparison of figure 2 and figure 3 shows that government decisions will depend on whether or not domestic consumers' interests are taken into account. With high levels of differentiation, duties will always prevail, whereas with high levels of γ , i.e. highly homogeneous goods, and low levels of asymmetry, undertakings will always arise. But inbetween levels of differentiation will results in undertakings with consumer interests ignored, while duties are more likely to prevail if consumer interests are taken into account.
Another reason why foreign firms would not immediately quote the ex post price/quantity and avoid filing, is because it typically takes time before the filing procedure is finished and the duty or undertaking is imposed. An analysis of EU cases learns that the investigation period on average lasts 12 months (Messerlin (1989) ). During that period usually no measures are imposed 20 . As long as the loss in foreign firm's profits from immediately implementing the anti-dumping measures outweigh the filing costs, foreign firms have no interest in anticipating the government action.
Filing costs
20 Temporary measures can be imposed if asked for by the complaining European firms.
Filing costs represent all expenditures associated with filing, such as legal expenses, administration costs, but also the opportunity costs of managerial or other personnel time spent on the case. As already indicated, the level of filing costs considered in the previous section is relatively modest: only 1% of pre-entry profits. Lower levels of ε do not change the reported results 21 . Of course, if filing costs would be prohibitively high to outweigh the domestic firm's benefits from filing, the no-file option will prevail. This critical level of the filing cost depends on the extra benefits of the domestic firm from the filing option and hence will be specific for a duty or an undertaking decision and vary across market structures. The smaller the cost-asymmetry, the lower the critical filing costs will be. This implies that, all else equal, the larger the asymmetries, the more legal costs firms are willing to incur to get "protection". Typically, the domestic firm realizes higher profits from an undertaking as compared to a duty, and hence is willing to incur higher filing costs when an undertaking can be foreseen. The market structure in which the firms are embedded likewise influences the critical filing costs. Typically, the critical filing costs will be highest in a full cartel, inbetween in a domestic cartel and lowest in a triopoly. Therefore domestic firms are willing to pay most for anti-dumping measures when they are in a full cartel scenario. This result holds independent of the level of differentiation and asymmetry. However, the difference between these critical costs reduces when firms become less asymmetric.
Given that the critical filing costs are specific for each market outcome, one could imagine settings in which filing costs are substantial enough to prevent firms from filing in some outcomes, while still allowing for a filing decision in others. This in turn is likely to have an impact on the final equilibrium outcome. Most of the supra observed anti-competitive effects of antidumping remain or are reinforced with filing costs higher than 0.1. 22 However, the pro-competitive effects of antidumping are not robust for higher levels of filing costs. For instance, if filing costs are high enough to prevent filing in area G in figure 3 , but not high enough to prevent filing in case of a full cartel with duties, 23 the final equilibrium outcome would be a domestic cartel with no file. Although the domestic firm would prefer a full cartel with a duty imposed, the foreign firm will not align on the cartel. Hence, in this case the anti-dumping regulation has no impact on market structure.
Similarly, the beneficial move from a full cartel towards a domestic cartel because of the anti-dumping procedure, in area K in figure 3, would vanish with higher filing costs. If filing costs are higher than the critical filing costs in a domestic cartel, it would prevent filing in a (2+1)-scenario with undertaking, resulting in a full cartel as the final equilibrium, leaving the market structure unaffected by the existence of an anti-dumping regulation.
Welfare effects and rent shifting
A critical question from a trade policy point of view is whether anti-dumping protection increases European welfare vis-à-vis welfare in the absence of protection. The ability of governments to increase welfare through unilateral protection in imperfectly competitive industries was first developed by Brander & Spencer (1985) and Eaton and Grossman (1986) . In the literature, this is known as the Strategic Trade Policy argument for protection. When governments can credibly precommit to a specific trade policy, government intervention secures a larger market share for the domestic producers and shifts rent from the foreign producers to the domestic economy. In this paper, the results, it is important to note that welfare effects arise not only because of the imposition of a duty or an undertaking within a given market structure, but also because of possible changes in firm's incentives to collude induced by the existence of an anti-dumping regulation. Furthermore, the imposition of anti-dumping measures does not always coincide with rent-shifting. Cases will be pinpointed where an increase in domestic surplus because of the anti-dumping regulation is not always to the detriment of foreign firms.
Community Interest Clause Implemented ( G= CS + PS + T)
When the product asymmetry and the cost advantage for the foreign firm are substantial (γ < s < 0.8), it is optimal for the government, when its objective function includes producer and consumer interests, to install an anti-dumping duty. Figure 4 shows that whenever a duty is imposed, total community welfare increases (area Q). In these cases, the duty revenue and increases in local producer surplus are high enough to offset the reduction in consumer surplus as a result of antidumping protection. Under duty protection, local producer surplus increases and foreign surplus decreases. Interesting to note is that the scope for rent-shifting increases with the cost advantage of the foreign firm.
An increase in welfare with an undertaking is far less likely. The only parameter constellations where this occurs is for low cost asymmetries and high product differentiation resulting in a full cartel market structure. This is indicated by area P in figure 4. Here the loss in consumer surplus is more than compensated by the shift in profits from the foreign to the domestic firms due to the undertaking. For all other parameter constellations where undertakings are imposed, domestic welfare is reduced. The reason is that in this area the gains that accrue to local producers are far smaller than the losses suffered by the local consumers. The overall reduction in welfare can be split up in two opposing forces. On the one hand there is a negative welfare effect caused by the anticompetitive effect of an undertaking on the market structure (see figure 2) . On the other hand, the imposition of an undertaking yields a positive welfare effect. However, the cartelization of the market is the more dominant effect of the two, resulting in a net negative welfare impact. When product differentiation is reduced (higher levels of γ), the negative welfare change caused by the change in market structure is even reinforced as we go from a triopoly to a full international cartel. In these cases, an undertaking also increases the profits of the foreign firm. 
Community Interest Clause Unimplemented (G =PS + T)
When the EU government is ignoring consumer interests, again a correspondence between the welfare changes and the type of measures installed can be established. It can be seen from figure 5 that with a duty, total welfare increases, whereas an undertaking always results in a welfare decrease, irrespective whether the undertaking has a pro-competitive (γ<0.75) or an anti-competitive effect (γ>0.8), see figure 3. In those instances where an undertaking enhances competition, the welfare gain from increased competition is offset by the negative welfare effects of an undertaking, given the market structure. When an undertaking reduces competition, this leads to a negative welfare change that reinforces the negative welfare effect of protection. Hence, pro-competitive effects of antidumping are only welfare improving if they involve duties rather than undertakings.
Prediction 5: When consumers' interests are ignored, the EU antidumping regulation increases
European welfare with a duty imposed and decreases with an undertaking imposed even if a procompetitive effect would be observed.
-insert figure 5 about here- Figure 5 : The change in welfare (CS+PS+T) between the equilibrium market structure with anti-dumping regulation and the market structure in case of no-Anti-dumping regulation
Consumer surplus excluded and tariff revenues included in the government's objective G = PS + T
When only local producer surplus is taken into account and tariff revenues are ignored, the results are very homogeneous for all parameter constellations and hence not shown here. Although domestic producers are always better off with than without the undertaking, total welfare is always lower under anti-dumping protection. This result holds both in the case where anti-dumping measures have a pro-as opposed to an anti-competitive effect.
Contingent protection and rent-seeking
Previously we touched upon the reason why a government may want to limit its objective to producer surplus only. According to the political economy of protection literature, the political market is similar to other markets with the level of protection is the outcome of supply and demand forces. Typically, the demand side consisting of domestic producers is well organized and is willing to devote resources trying to get a decision in its favor: rent-seeking. Finger, Hall and Nelson (1982) and Tharakan and Waelbroeck (1994) are two econometric studies that confirm the political economy explanation for antidumping protection in the US and the EU respectively.
The simulation results in our paper suggest that domestic firms' profits are always highest with an undertaking in the (2+1)-market structure. However, when the government cares about total community welfare, this solution is never arrived at. When products are very heterogeneous and cost asymmetries large (bottom left area in figure 2), the government imposes duties which lead only to a limited gain for domestic producers. When products are more homogeneous and cost differences small (top right corner in figure 2), the equilibrium outcome is a full cartel where undertakings will prevail, since in a domestic cartel only a duty will prevail. Although domestic producers' gains under undertakings in a full cartel are already higher than under a duty, they could have gotten more if only the government had decided on an undertaking in the (2+1)-structure. Only when the government limits its objective to domestic producer surplus, this outcome is reached and domestic producers get their highest payoff possible in the game and this for all the parameter constellations. Hence, domestic producers have an incentive to engage in rent-seeking activities in order to try and induce the government to change its objective from general welfare to domestic profits only. The model shows that the incentive to rent-seek increases when the cost asymmetry is higher and products differ more.
The possibility to engage in rent-seeking is not limited to the domestic firms only but also applies to the foreign firm. The foreign firm is always best off without intervention and the highest payoff is reached under the full cartel (3)-situation without antidumping measures. 25 In case the government is determined to intervene, foreign firms can still try to reach their most preferred antidumping measure. Under the (2+1)-market structure, for small cost differences, the foreign firm shares the domestic firm's preference for undertakings over duties. However, for substantial cost differences the foreign firm is better off with a duty. In those cases, domestic and foreign firms' interests clash. In a full cartel (3)-structure and in a triopoly (1+1+1)-structure, both the domestic and the foreign firm will always prefer an undertaking over a duty. 
Conclusions
This paper is the first to study the effect of European anti-dumping policy on market structure and welfare with a fixed number of firms. In the set up of the model, the actual EU decisionmaking process is modeled as closely as possible. In earlier empirical studies it has been alleged that European antidumping cases often involve cartels (Messerlin, 1990 . The paper starts off assuming the existence of a domestic European cartel in the absence of foreign entry. In a further step it is analyzed how EU-antidumping legislation provides incentives for domestic and foreign firms to engage or not in a domestic or full cartel after foreign entry.
The results show that when domestic and foreign firms are perfectly symmetric, all firms have an incentive to collude, irrespective of whether an anti-dumping legislation is in existence or not.
The analysis becomes more interesting when asymmetries between the domestic and the foreign firms are considered. When the EU acts in the spirit of the Community Interest Clause, the antidumping measures taken are predominantly duties. Only when cost differences are small, undertakings will be installed. When market structure changes, it is always towards a more anti-competitive market structure. In some instances the EU market structure goes from a domestic to an international cartel and in other instances from a triopoly to a full international cartel when antidumping law is implemented. When the scope of the government objective function is narrowed down to domestic producer surplus and tariff revenue only, the model predominantly predicts the use of undertakings.
Only in the event of substantial cost differences and considerable product heterogeneity between domestic and foreign firms, duties will be imposed. Ignoring consumer welfare, an undertaking can either have a pro-competitive or an anti-competitive effect on market structure. If the government objective function is narrowed even further to domestic producer surplus only, undertakings are the only type of measures observed for all cases. The market structure is usually not affected by the antidumping implementation. However in a relatively limited number of instances there are procompetitive and anti-competitive effects.
The findings reported in this paper suggest that use of antidumping measures can both have a pro-or an anti-competitive effect, depending on the government objective function, cost asymmetries and product heterogeneity. Pro-competitive effects of anti-dumping legislation tend to occur with high product differentiation and limited cost asymmetries. But they are sensitive to filing costs and only occur when consumers interests are not taken into account. Anti-competitive effects are more robust for filing costs and occur with all possible governmental objective functions. With respect to the type of measure installed, the model clearly shows that decreasing the importance of consumer interests in the government welfare function leads to an increasing number of undertakings. Given that empirical studies have pointed out the EU's tendency towards undertakings rather than duties, our model can be used to explain this tendency as the result of mainly safeguarding domestic producers' interests. This confirms practitioners' well established intuitive beliefs.
A welfare analysis revealed that the imposition of a duty in the equilibrium market structure typically increases total domestic welfare. In the case of a duty, the rent shifting from foreign producers more than compensates domestic consumer losses. The scope for such rent-shifting is normally larger with larger cost-asymmetries. However in case of undertakings, the welfare effect tends to be negative. A decrease in consumer surplus from the increase in price as well as the typical anti-competitive effect of anti-dumping outweigh the benefits to domestic producers. Even in cases where undertakings have a pro-competitive effect, the welfare gain from increased competition never compensates the losses from the undertaking.
By showing an anti-as well as a pro-competitive effect of EU anti-dumping legislation, the paper encompasses previous findings in the literature that showed that antidumping either had a pro- (Reitzes 1993; Fischer, 1992) or an anti-competitive effect (Staiger & Wolak 1992) . But from a trade or anti-trust policy perspective, the results clearly ask for a cautious policy stance given the difficulty of assessing circumstances where one or the other effect applies.
